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Copyright ©On the basis of an empirical analysis of 491 UK recent secondary management buyouts
(SMBOs), we ﬁnd strong evidence of a deterioration in long-run abnormal returns following
SMBOdeals. SMBOs also performworse than primary buyouts in terms of proﬁtability, labor
productivity, and growth.We ﬁnd no evidence for superior performance of private equity (PE)
backed SMBOs, compared with their non-PE-backed counterparts. It appears that a PE ﬁrm’s
reputation and change in management are important determinants of improvements in proﬁt-
ability and labor productivity, respectively. High debt and high percentage of management
equity tend to be associated with poor performance measured by proﬁtability and labor
productivity. Notably, none of the buyout mechanisms (i.e., ﬁnancial, governance, operating)
normally associated with performance improvements generate growth during the secondary
buyout phase. The results are robust to the use of alternative performance measures, alterna-
tive benchmarks, and the possibility of sample selection bias. Copyright © 2013 The Authors.
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A leveraged buyout involves a form of takeover in
which private equity (PE) investors, and often a
company’s management team, pool their own money
(together with debt ﬁnance) to buy shares in that
company from its current owners to create a new inde-
pendent entity with a new typically highly leveraged
ﬁnancing structure (Gilligan and Wright, 2012). Prior
to the buyout, the company may have been listed on a
stock market, a division of a larger corporate or a
privately held/family ﬁrm. An aspect of the considerable
debate about PE concerns the longevity of the buyoutce to: University of Birmingham, Birmingham B15
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have suggested that buyouts represent a new long-term
form, whereas others have been more circumspect
(Rapppaport, 1990) or suggest that it is more heteroge-
neous (Wright et al., 1994).
Private equity ﬁrms typically seek an exit after an
average of 5–6 years, either by taking the company
public through an initial public offering (IPO) or via a
strategic sale to another corporation (Kaplan and
Stromberg, 2009; Wright et al., 2010). A buyout gover-
nance structure may continue in the form of a secondary
management buyout (SMBO). An SMBO is a buyout of
a buyout in which the initial (primary) buyout is acquired
by a new set of PE ﬁnanciers and/or management,
together with new borrowings. Over the past decade,
the number of UK SMBOs has been increasing, while
numbers of non-SMBO buyouts have been decreasing
(Figure 1, panel A). Recent years have also seen an
increase in SMBOs average size and the number of exits
from SMBOs (Figure 1, panel B).1 The aforementionedon Economics published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Panel B: Exits from SMBOs by years
Source: CMBOR/Ernst&Young/Equistone European Partners
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Figure 1. UK buyouts in the last decade.
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increase from 4.6% (in 2000) to 45% (in 2010). The pop-
ularity of SMBOs thus raises the opportunity to examine
important questions regarding the life cycle, longevity,
and the sustainability of gains on PE investments that
have implications for both research and practice.
There are two contrasting views on post-SMBO per-
formance. Some argue that value creation mechanisms
have already been adopted during ﬁrst buyouts (Wright
et al., 2000a). It is, therefore, hard for PE ﬁrms to gener-
ate further value. Thus, SMBO transactions could be a
way to buy more time for IPO or trade sale exits, rather
than an organization structure facilitating new value
creation. In this scenario, SMBOs may not generate sig-
niﬁcant wealth for target companies (Jelic and Wright,
2011). In contrast, others argue that SMBOs can still
improve the performance of target companies, because
some PE ﬁrms may exit (primary) buyouts before fully
achieving all improvements. For example, an ‘early’
exit could be due to the end of a PE fund’s life (Sousa,
2010; Achleitner and Figge, 2012) or because a PE ﬁrm
attempts to enhance its reputation by creating a track re-
cord (Stromberg, 2008; Harford and Kolasinski, 2010).
Incoming PE ﬁrms may also apply new strategies or
change practices adopted by original backers as agency
issues have been largely addressed in the ﬁrst buyout.
Emerging research ﬁnds mixed evidence on the
performance of SMBOs. For instance, according to
worldwide data, Achleitner and Figge (2012) showedWithat SMBOs still yield operational performance im-
provements, relative to primary buyouts. Bonini
(2012), however, did not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant improved
performance of European SMBOs. Wang (2012)
reported that UK SMBOs perform better in generating
cash ﬂows but worse in generating earnings than
primary buyouts. Jelic and Wright (2011) similarly ﬁnd
a signiﬁcant improvement in output and dividends,
accompanied by signiﬁcant reductions in gearing and
proﬁtability for the UK SMBOs. The previous studies
focus on operating performance in the ﬁrst 3 years after
SMBO (Achleitner and Figge, 2012; Bonini, 2012;
Wang, 2012) and long-term operating performance in
the early 2000s (Jelic and Wright, 2011).
We had collected data for 491 UK SMBOs during
2000–2010. The data used in this study are novel and
absent from other studies. For example, we incorporate
data on both PE-backed and non-PE-backed SMBOs,
pre-SMBO and post-SMBO performance (up to 3 years
before and 5 years after SMBO), longevity of SMBOs,
exit status, and exit routes from SMBOs, and cover the
current recessionary period. By using this more compre-
hensive dataset, we contribute to the literature in several
ways. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁrst complement the traditional
agency perspective with a strategic entrepreneurship
perspective, which may be especially relevant in
buyouts of companies that have already experienced
the introduction of agency cost-reducing governance
mechanisms. Second, we offer insights into whether
and to what extent the typical value creation mechanisms
in primary buyout structures can also drive performance
in the second buyout round. Third, we provide evidence
on the differences in post-buyout performance between
SMBOs and primary private-to-private buyouts. Fourth,
we examine the speciﬁc role of PE by comparing the per-
formance of PE-backed and non-PE-backed SMBOs and
by examining reputation of PE ﬁrms. As such, we add to
literature that has identiﬁed the importance of PE ﬁrm
reputation in primary buyouts by showing that it is also
important in SMBOs. Fifth, we examine the importance
of changing senior executives and increasing managerial
equity for the performance. Finally, given the recent pol-
icy debate regarding ‘short-termism’ of UK equity mar-
ket (Kay, 2012), we provide insights into a longer-term
impact of PE in SMBOs than previous studies.
We ﬁnd lower proﬁtability, labor productivity, and
growth from the ﬁrst to ﬁfth post-SMBO years. SMBOs
underperform their matched counterparts of primary
private-to-private buyouts in proﬁtability, labor produc-
tivity, and growth. Although PE backing (alone) does
not seem to drive changes in the performance, PE
ﬁrms’ reputation is an important determinant of theley & Sons, Ltd.
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formance are debt coverage, gearing and replacements
of management. Our results suggest that the most
popular exit routes from our sample SMBOs are trade
sales (40%) and tertiary management buyouts (TMBOs)
(34%), followed by receivership (20%) and IPOs (6%).
Overall, our results are in line with evidence that better-
performing companies tend to exit via IPOs and trade
sales and that subsequent buyouts (i.e., SMBO and
TMBO) tend to be used to buy more time before trade
sale and IPO exits.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 motivates hypotheses. This is followed by
Section 3 that describes data and methodology.
Section 4 presents results of univariate and multivariate
analysis. In Section 5, we analyze the robustness of our
results. Section 6 is conclusion.2. PREVIOUS LITERATURE
2.1. Determinants of Performance
The main mechanisms for performance improvements
in buyouts are (i) operational engineering, (ii) ﬁnancial
engineering, and (iii) governance engineering (Kaplan
and Stromberg, 2009). Operational engineering refers
to PE experts with operating backgrounds and industrial
focus who are able to add value to target companies.
More reputable PE ﬁrms tend to recruit professionals
with various backgrounds (Kaplan and Stromberg,
2009) who use their knowledge to identify attractive
investment opportunities and help improve value crea-
tion. The PE ﬁrms’ reputation therefore is expected to
be associated with operational engineering. Financial
engineering refers to the tax shield and free cash ﬂow
pressure resulting from the use of debt (Kaplan, 1989).
Higher leverage also prevents managers from wasting
money because of the need to repay principal and
service interest payments (Kaplan, 1989; Kaplan and
Stromberg, 2009; Harford and Kolasinski, 2010). The
controlling effect of debt is greater the lower the multi-
ple of proﬁts or cash ﬂow to interest payments as this
leaves less scope for managers to engage in activities
that jeopardize the company’s ability to service borrow-
ings (Nikoskelainen and Wright, 2007). Governance
engineering refers to PE ﬁrms’ monitoring, governance
intervention, and incentive alignment. PE ﬁrms monitor
as active board members to minimize management
inefﬁciency (Christian and Marc, 2012). PE ﬁrms often
replace company’s executives, call more boardmeetings
(Acharya et al., 2010), and tend to dramatically decreaseCopyright © 2013 The Authors.
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buyout investors improve incentive alignment between
shareholders and managers by adopting stock options
or motivating managers to make a meaningful invest-
ment and avoid manipulating short-run performance
(Jensen, 1989; Kaplan, 1989).2.2. SMBOs Improve Performance?
Some authors suggest that performance may improve in
SMBOs because of PE ﬁrms’ early exit. In the primary
buyout phase, PE-backed buyouts tend to obtain greater
performance improvements compared with non-PE-
backed buyouts because of PE ﬁrm active monitoring
that reduces agency costs (Cressy et al., 2007;
Nikoskelainen and Wright, 2007).
Private equity ﬁrms’ strong industry background and
operational experience can also improve target company
performance (Kaplan and Stromberg, 2009). As PE
funds have limited lives, some primary PE investors
may need to exit investments before all potential
improvements to particular portfolio companies are
achieved. Alternatively, PE funds may exit primary
portfolio company investments prematurely to create a
track record to enhance their reputation (Stromberg,
2008; Harford and Kolasinski, 2010; Achleitner and
Figge, 2012). Finally, some non-PE-backed primary
buyouts could introduce governance mechanisms (e.g.,
PE backing or high leverage) on SMBO. Those buyouts
would be expected to exhibit an improvement in perfor-
mance in the SMBO phase.
Primary buyouts of some (smaller) private compa-
nies are backed by relatively small PE ﬁrms (Kitzmann
and Schiereck, 2009). The small PE ﬁrms may lack the
experience and human resources to assist development
once the target companies reach a certain level. In the
SMBO phase, the entry of larger more proﬁtable PE
ﬁrms with speciﬁc complementary knowledge and skills
may help them realize further performance improve-
ments (Acharya et al., 2010; Sousa, 2010; Wang,
2012). In those cases, the PE ﬁrms’ reputation is expe-
cted to be an important determinant of performance.
Private equity ﬁrms may also replace existing
management, in order to hire more capable managers
and to initiate changes in the compensation structure.
For example, a new compensation structure could
enable management to acquire a greater equity stake in
the company, which increases their incentive to improve
efﬁciency and provides them with more discretion, in
terms of implementing entrepreneurial decisions. When
management stays on board and increases their equity
(Wright et al., 2000a), the target companies also beneﬁtley & Sons, Ltd.
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whereas traditional agency theory in buyouts only
emphasizes the reduction of costs caused by over-
investment and over-diversiﬁcation, the strategic entre-
preneurship perspective emphasizes that managers and
PE ﬁrms are strongly motivated to employ their idiosyn-
cratic knowledge, skills, experience, and capabilities to
exploit growth opportunities (Wright et al., 2000b;
Meuleman et al., 2009). PE ﬁrms and management
may pursue growth opportunities even though it may
not be reﬂected initially in proﬁtability because it can
enhance company value and size, making eventual exit
through IPOs or trade sale more feasible.2.3. SMBOs Buy Time?
In contrast, a number of arguments suggest that SMBOs
are not likely to improve the performance of target
companies. Rather, they are used to buy more time
before IPO or trade sale exits. For example, the effects
of the buyout performance improvement mechanisms
(management monitoring, PE ﬁrm’s participation, and
leverage) introduced in the ﬁrst transaction are likely
to last for 2–3 years after buyout (Wiersema and
Liebeskind, 1995; Wright et al., 2009). Extensive
evidence from primary buyouts has identiﬁed increases
in accounting proﬁtability and productivity (Kaplan,
1989; Cumming et al., 2007; Meuleman et al., 2009)
as well as in real economic productivity and efﬁciency
(Lichtenberg and Siegel, 1990; Harris et al., 2005)
during this time compared with pre-buyout.
After this period, the speed of performance improve-
ment seems to decline (Jelic and Wright, 2011). The
beneﬁts from squeezing out productivity improvements
may gradually become exhausted whereas associated
lack of slack resources may mean that adaptations to
changing conditions are restricted when niche markets
begin to mature and decline.
In addition to pressure to exit because the fund is
coming toward the end of its life, PE ﬁrms will also exit
when the marginal value added is less than the marginal
costs (Cumming andMacIntosh, 2003). This means that
when exiting, their skill set is exhausted and value added
cannot be increased. A public offering or trade sale
would usually be the ﬁrst exit choices (Schwienbacher,
2002; Jelic, 2011). When a public offering and a trade
sale are not available, a secondary sale may be one of
the few options left.
Although management investments in SMBOs are
usually higher as a result of their greater bargaining
power from performance in the ﬁrst deal (Manchot,
2010; Achleitner and Figge, 2012) and may lead to aCopyright © 2013 The Authors.
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greater entrenchment behavior. To the extent that
greater bargaining power of management is associated
with reduced monitoring by PE investors in an SMBO
compared with a primary buyout, search and pursuit of
new growth opportunities may be riskier especially
outside areas of existing expertise, with adverse implica-
tions for performance.3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
3.1. Data and Sample Descriptive Statistics
We initiated our data collection with the Centre for
Management Buyout Research (CMBOR) database.
The original deal list comprises 612 UK SMBOs deals
completed during 2000–2007.2 We then collected data
on activities, deal values, PE backing, and capital struc-
ture in the transaction year (from CMBOR, Thomson
One Banker, PE ﬁrms’ websites, and www.growth-
business.co.uk). We also obtained data on exit status
and exit routes of the buyouts until end of 2010. Finally,
we collected data on changes in management and
management equity stakes from FAME, Nexis UK,
Keynote, and annual reports.3
The majority of ﬁrms in our sample are small-size to
medium-size private companies and, therefore, not
available on either ThomsonOne Banker orWorldscope
databases.4 Thus, we choose the FAME database to
collect ﬁnancial information.5 We were able to collect
ﬁnancial details (for up to 10 years) together with details
about directors, shareholders, subsidiaries, and industry
for 516 sample SMBOs. We excluded SMBOs from the
ﬁnancial sector because their ﬁnancial reports are
different from other industries. The aforementioned
sample selection procedure resulted in our ﬁnal sample
consisting of 491 SMBOs (Table 1). The majority of
sample buyouts (323) are PE backed. The remaining
168 deals are pure buyouts (i.e., they did not receive
PE funding). Among the 491 sample SMBOs, 48%
exited their SMBO structure during the sample period.
Trade sale (82 deals) is the most popular exit route from
SMBOs. TMBO is the second most popular exit route
(69 deals), followed by receivership (including adminis-
tration) (41 deals) and IPOs (12 deals).
Business services (41%) is the largest industry group
in our sample, followed by consumer (23%) and
business and industrial (21%) sectors.6 As to exit routes,
IPO exits tend to be more common in Internet and com-
puters, communication and electronics, and consumer
sectors. TMBO and receivership exits tend to be moreley & Sons, Ltd.
Manage. Decis. Econ. 35: 88–102 (2014)
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able 1. Sample SMBOs
Population Sample
N N % of population
otal number of SMBOs 612 491 80.2
E backed (% of N) 396 (64.7) 323 (65.8) 81.6
on-PE backed (% of N) 216 (35.3) 168 (34.2) 77.8
on-exits (% of N) 358 (58.5) 287 (58.5) 80.2
xits from SMBO (% of N) 254 (41.5) 204 (41.5) 80.3
O (% of exits) 12 (4.7) 12 (5.9) 100.0
MBO (% of exits) 83 (32.7) 69 (33.8) 83.1
ale (% of exits) 95 (37.4) 82 (40.2) 86.3
eceivership (% of exits) 64 (25.2) 41 (20.1) 64.1
his table presents population and sample secondary management buyouts (SMBOs) by private equity backing and by exit status, from 2000
2010. Non-exits are sample buyouts that have not exited their SMBO structure by 31 December 2010. Exit routes are initial public offer-
g (IPO), tertiary management buyout (TMBO), trade sale (Sale), and receivership.
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inpopular in business services. Similarly, PE-backed
SMBOs tend to be more popular in business services
and consumer sectors.7 Deﬁnitions of all variables used
in the analysis are presented in Table 2. Sample descrip-
tive statistics are presented in Table 3.
Private-equity-backed SMBOs are approximately
twice as large as their non-PE-backed counterparts.
Management’s share of the total equity is 59.8% on
average (median is 59.9%). Non-PE-backed SMBOs
tend to receive almost three times more management
investment. Average (mean) debt coverage is 5.02, in-
dicating that SMBOs are highly leveraged. PE-backed
SMBOs exhibit signiﬁcantly higher gearing ratios
compared with their non-PE-backed counterparts.
The average (mean) duration of sample buyouts, in
their primary buyout phase, is 49.83months.8 The
average duration of sample SMBOs is 40.57months.
The chief executive ofﬁcer (CEO) and chief ﬁnancial
ofﬁcer were changed in 135 cases in the SMBO year.
PE-backed SMBOs tend to replace management more
often compared with non-PE-backed buyouts. The
difference between PE-backed and non-PE-backed
samples is, however, not statistically signiﬁcant. 93.2. Methodology
Performance Measures. The proﬁtability of
SMBOs is measured as return on assets (ROA) and
return on sales (ROS). We also calculate labor produc-
tivity (SALEMP), sales growth (SALG), and employ-
ment growth (EMPG) (Delmar et al., 2003; Meuleman
et al., 2009). Sales growth captures growth in additional
revenue creation whereas employment growth captures
the growth in labor resources.Copyright © 2013 The Authors.
Managerial and Decision Economics published by John WiThe abnormal performance is calculated as the
difference between actual performance and expected
performance, as follows:
APit ¼ Pit  E Pitð Þ (1)
where Pit is the actual performance of company i in
year t; E(Pit) is the expectation of performance of
company i in year t; APit is the abnormal performance
for various performance ratios: ROA, ROS, SALEMP,
EMPG, and SALG. Earnings may be deliberately
overstated in the year before IPO or other exit (Jain
and Kini, 1995). Hence, we adopt the median
performance in the 3-year period before exit as a mea-
sure of the pre-SMBO performance.10 We compare
the performance in each year post-event with the
expected SMBO performance, for a period of up to
5 years.11 Our expected performance model is based
on both the ‘level’ and ‘change’ models suggested
by Barber and Lyon (1996). The level model uses a
company’s 3-year median pre-SMBO performance as
expected performance (Equation (2)). The change
model uses the company’s past performance plus the
change in the industry’s performance as the expected
performance (Equation (3)). The expected perfor-
mance models are as follows:
E Pitð Þ ¼ Pi;t3 (2)
E Pitð Þ ¼ Pi;t3 þ ΔPIit (3)
where Pit 3 is 3-year median pre-SMBO performance
of company i. PIit is deﬁned as the industry perfor-
mance (control group) for company i in period t. ΔPIit
is the difference between the industry’s performance
in period t and the industry’s 3-year median pre-
SMBO performance.ley & Sons, Ltd.
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Table 2. Deﬁnitions of Variables
Description Variable Deﬁnition
Performance measures
Proﬁtability ratios
Return on assets ROA Earnings before interests and taxes (EBIT) scaled by total assets.
EBITDAA Earnings before interests, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA)
scaled by total assets.
Abnormal return on assets AROA The difference between actual ROA in year t and expected ROA in year t
AEBITDAA The difference between actual EBITDAA in year t and expected EBITDAA
in year t.
Return on sales ROS Earnings before interests and taxes (EBIT) scaled by total sales.
EBITDAS Earnings before interests, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA)
scaled by total sales.
Abnormal return on sales AROS The difference between actual ROS in year t and expected ROS in year t.
AEBITDAS The difference between actual EBITDAS in year t and expected EBITDAS/
i> in year t.
Labor productivity ratios
Sales productivity SALEMP Inﬂation adjusted sales scaled by the number of employees.
Abnormal sales productivity ASALEMP The difference between actual SALEMP in year t and expected SALEMP in
year t.
Growth indicators
Employment growth EMPG The difference between the numbers of employee in year t and year t 1
scaled by average of number of employees in year t and year t 1.
Abnormal employment growth AEMPG The difference between actual SALEMP in year t and expected SALEMP in
year t.
Sales growth SALG The difference between sales in year t and year t 1 scaled by average of
sale in year t and year t 1.
Abnormal sales growth ASALG The difference between actual SALEMP in year t and expected SALEMP in
year t.
Determinants of performance
Managerial equity ownership
Management share MGTSHARE The percentage of target company’s common equity contributed by
management in year t.
Debt bonding
Debt coverage DEBTCOV The amount of long-term and short-term debt divided by operating income
before interests, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) in year t.
PE backing
PE backed PE A dummy variable, which equals to 1 if SMBO is backed by PE ﬁrms and
0 otherwise.
Backed by more reputable PE ﬁrms TOP10 A dummy variable, which equals to 1 if SMBO was backed by one of the
top 10 most reputable PE ﬁrms and 0 otherwise.
Governance intervention
Management changing MGTCHAN A dummy variable, which equals to 1 if the CEO or CFO is replaced in the
transaction year, and 0 otherwise.
Determinants of PE backing and control variables
Companies’ size SIZE The deal value (£ million).
Companies’ industry BSERVICES A dummy variable, which equals to 1 if the SMBO is from business service
industry, and 0 otherwise.
Gearing GEAR The sum of long-term and short-term debt divided by the total equity.
Financial crisis Crisis A dummy variable, which equals to 1 for observations from 2008, 2009, and
2010 (the ﬁnancial crisis years) and 0 otherwise.
Lambda Lambda The ﬁtted probability of receiving PE backing, estimated by Equation (4).
Pre-SMBO ratios Pre The performance ratios (PreROA, PreROS, PreSALEMP, PreEMPG, and
PreSALG) in year preceding the SMBO.
Post POST A dummy variable equal to 1 for performance ratios up to 5 years after the
SMBO transaction, and 0 otherwise.
The longevity of buyout 1st DURA 1st duration indicates the number of months from the primary buyout date to
the SMBO date.
2nd DURA The number of months from the SMBO date to the exit date if the
SMBO exited.
2nd DURA_all The number of months from the SMBO date to the exit date if the SMBO
exited or the number of months from the SMBO date to the last date (31
December 2010) if the SMBO did not exit.
SMBO 93
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Managerial and Decision Economics published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Manage. Decis. Econ. 35: 88–102 (2014)
DOI: 10.1002/mde.
able 3. Sample Descriptive Statistics
Full sample PE backing (median)
Mean Median SD PE Non-PE P-value
IZE 96.133 31.300 189.865 45.500 5.500 (0.000)
EAR 1.551 0.780 2.093 0.824 0.670 (0.000)
GTSHARE 0.598 0.599 0.351 0.370 1.000 (0.000)
EBTCOV 5.025 1.434 32.060 1.358 1.649 (0.192)
st DURA 49.830 45.000 28.697 44.000 48.500 (0.564)
nd DURA 40.574 37.500 20.465 38.000 37.000 (0.548)
nd DURA_all 56.637 54.000 26.212 50.000 63.000 (0.000)
his table presents results for sample SMBOs characteristics. All variables are deﬁned in Table 2. P-values (in brackets) are for Mann–
hitney test for median differences in SIZE, GEAR, MGTSHARE, DEBTCOV, 1st DURA, and 2nd DURA. Values of GEAR, MGTSHARE,
nd DEBTCOV are computed for full sample, up to 5 years after SMBOs.
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aIn our univariate analysis, we test whether the
abnormal performance is signiﬁcantly different from
the ﬁrst to ﬁfth post-event years. As there are outliers
in our data, all estimates are based on winsorized
data.12 In addition, we employ a Wilcoxon signed-
rank test to test whether the median value of abnor-
mal performance in each post-event year equals zero
or not.
Determinants of Performance. Our sample
descriptive statistics show that PE-backed SMBOs
tend to be different from non-PE-backed SMBOs in
terms of industry distribution, size, and pre-event
performance. These differences suggest that PE ﬁrms
do not randomly choose companies in which to invest
but conduct due diligence to select companies with a
greater probability of success after SMBOs. To
address selection bias, we employ a Heckman two-
step estimation procedure (Jelic and Wright, 2011).
In the ﬁrst step, we estimate a probit regression with
a PE dummy equal to 1 if PE-backed and 0 otherwise.
This step allows us to estimate the probability of
receiving PE backing (Lambda). The second stage em-
ploys a panel regression via a generalized least squares
random-effects procedure with robust standard errors.
We prefer the panel method over standard ordinary
least squares as the panel method utilizes data from
the entire post-event (i.e., SMBO) period whereas
ordinary least squares relies on data from only one
post-event year. In addition, the panel data method
takes into account the effects of estimation error due
to the correlation of the residuals across ﬁrms (Fama
and French, 2001).
We hypothesize that choice of PE backing is asso-
ciated with size (as in Brau et al., 2003 and Stromberg,
2008), pre-event performance (as in Bienz, 2004 and
Sudarsanam, 2005), and industry (as in Berger et al.,
1999 and Bayar and Chemmanur, 2006). The probit
model is as follows13:Copyright © 2013 The Authors.
Managerial and Decision Economics published by John WiPEi ¼ αþ β1BSERVICESi þ β2lnSIZEi
þβ3PreROAi þ εi
(4)
where PE is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the SMBO
receives PE backing, and 0 otherwise; BSERVICES
denotes a dummy variable equal to 1 if the SMBOs
is from business service industry, and 0 otherwise.
lnSIZE indicates the logarithm of SMBO deal’s value.
PreROA is return on assets in the year before SMBOs.
In the second stage model, we regress change in
performance ratios (AROA, AROS, ASALEMP,
AEMPG, and ASALG) on variables for managerial
equity ownership (MGTSHARE); gearing (GEAR); debt
bonding (DEBTCOV); PE ﬁrms’ involvement (PE); and
governance intervention (MGTCHAN). Control vari-
ables are natural logarithm of companies’ size (SIZE),
the ﬁnancial crisis effect (Crisis), Pre-SMBO ratios,
natural logarithm of duration of SMBOs (2nd
DURA_all), and the ﬁtted probability of receiving PE
backing (Lambda). The regression model is as follows:
Ratiosit ¼ αþ β1MGTSHAREit þ β2GEARit
þβ3DEBTCOVit þ β4PEit
þβ5MGTCHANit þ β6lnSIZEit
þβ7Crisisit þ β8PREit þ β9ln2nd DURA allit
þβ10Lambdait þ εit
(5)
More reputable PE ﬁrms tend to be more effective
both inmonitoring target companies and in adding value
via operational engineering. More reputable PE ﬁrms
use their superior network and experience to exploit
growth opportunities for target companies. Companies
backed by more reputable PE ﬁrms are, therefore, more
likely to generate better post-buyout performance. For
instance, Meuleman et al. (2009) ﬁnd that PE ﬁrms’
experience is positively associated with the growth ofley & Sons, Ltd.
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SMBO 95buyout companies. Jelic et al. (2005) also demonstrated
that buyouts backed by more reputable PE ﬁrms tend to
have better performance, in the long run, than those
backed by less reputable PE ﬁrms.
We rank PE ﬁrms on the basis of the reputation
score established by Jelic (2011).14 The 10 most repu-
table PE ﬁrms are as follows: 3i, Cinven, Bridgepoint
(formerly Nat West Partners), Charter House,
Candover, Electra, Legal and General Ventures,
Schroeder, IRRfc (used to be known as Phildrew
Ventures), and Hg Capital (formerly Mercury Asset
Management). We then create a dummy variable
(TOP10) that equals 1 when the SMBO is backed by
one of the top 10 PE ﬁrms, and 0 otherwise.15 We then
test for the reputational effect, in the PE-backed sub-
sample, within the following regression model:
Ratiosit ¼ αit þ β1MGTSHAREit þ β2GEARit
þβ3DEBTCOVit þ β4TOP10it
þβ5MGTCHANit þ β6lnSIZEit
þβ7Crisisit þ β8PREit
þβ9ln2nd DURAallit þ β10 Lambdait þ εit
(6)4. RESULTS
4.1. Univariate Analysis
Table 4 reports the results of various performance
measures. Panels A and B report the panel statisticsTable 4. Summary Results of Performance Measur
Full sample
N Min. Mean Median
Panel A: Pre-SMBO
ROA 981 3.479 0.084 0.077
ROS 899 7.721 0.041 0.056
SALEMP 917 0.999 2.134 2.071
EMPG 671 1.990 0.029 0.026
SALG 654 1.992 0.102 0.076
Panel B: Post-SMBO
ROA 1199 12.134 4.549 0.067
ROS 1009 279.270 0.522 0.054
SALEMP 880 1.430 2.164 2.102
EMPG 1052 1.982 0.010 0.010
SALG 947 1.988 0.044 0.047
This table presents summary results of various performance measures
performance measures before SMBO (3 years) and after SMBO (5 yea
of observations of SMBO for different performance measures. P-values
backed and non-PE-backed subsamples.
Copyright © 2013 The Authors.
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respectively. Comparing the two panels, EMPG and
SALG decrease in both mean and median values from
pre-SMBO to post-SMBO. Notably, the mean value
for (post-SMBO) EMPG is negative. Similarly, mean
ROS decreases after SMBO. By contrast, SALEMP
increases slightly in both mean and median values
after SMBO. ROA, on average, has greater increases
after SMBO. As the standard deviation indicates, there
are signiﬁcant differences in the proﬁtability (ROA and
ROS) of our sample buyouts.16 PE-backed SMBOs
tend to perform better in proﬁtability and growth but
worse in terms of labor productivity, compared with
non-PE-backed deals.
Table 5 presents the median abnormal ratios (AR)
(based on Equations (1) and (2)) and industry adjusted
AR (based on Equations (1) and (3)) up to 5 years after
the SMBO’s transaction year. To control for industry
inﬂuence, we collected performance data for all UK
active and inactive private companies (40,267 compa-
nies from FAME database) and estimate relevant
median industry ratios.
Our level abnormal performance for proﬁtability
ratio AROA is signiﬁcantly negative in each post-
SMBO year, consistent with previous UK SMBO
studies (Jelic and Wright, 2011; Wang, 2012). When
scaled by sales, proﬁtability (AROS) shows an increase
(not statistically signiﬁcant) in the ﬁrst year after
SMBO, followed by a statistically signiﬁcant decrease
(years 4 and 5). The industry adjusted changes show
similar negative and statically signiﬁcant results, but
of a smaller magnitude.es
PE backing (median)
Max. SD PE Non-PE P-value
0.715 0.182 0.088 0.060 (0.000)
1.000 0.334 0.072 0.032 (0.000)
5.206 0.490 2.039 2.138 (0.000)
1.775 0.266 0.037 0.004 (0.001)
1.969 0.339 0.088 0.037 (0.000)
5415.090 156.385 0.064 0.067 (0.301)
1.000 10.077 0.068 0.042 (0.000)
5.392 0.543 2.068 2.198 (0.000)
1.529 0.277 0.021 0.000 (0.000)
1.979 0.337 0.060 0.018 (0.000)
and their results by PE backing. Panels A and B report results fo
rs), respectively. Values reported in the column of N are the numbe
(in brackets) are for Mann–Whitney test for differences between PE
ley & Sons, Ltd.
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for level abnormal performance show a signiﬁcant in-
crease in labor productivity (measured by ASALEMP)
up to 4 years after SMBO. However, the positive per-
formance tends to decrease, becoming signiﬁcantly
negative in the ﬁfth year. Moreover, when we control
for industry inﬂuence, the positive changes disappear.
Similar to the proﬁtability ratios, there are signiﬁcant
reductions in the level growth ratios (measured by
AEMPG and ASLG). After adjusting for industry, sales
growth increases in years 1, 2, and 4. The increase in
growth, however, is not statistically signiﬁcant.
Overall, our results suggest that performance generally
deteriorates after SMBO.
Private-equity-backed SMBOs generally outper-
form their non-PE-backed counterparts in terms of prof-
itability (AROS) and labor productivity (ASALEMP) for
up to 2–4 years (Table 6). However, the differences are
statistically signiﬁcant only in respect of labor produc-
tivity. Furthermore, PE-backed SMBOs signiﬁcantly
underperform their counterparts (in years 3 and 5)
measured by AROA. Our results for growth ratios
ﬂuctuate over the 5-year post-SMBO period. Generally,
PE-backed SMBOs outperform in growth in the ﬁrst
post-SMBO year and underperform in the following
2–3 years, before recovering. Overall, the results
provide mixed evidence of the effects of PE backing
on the performance.4.2. Regression Results
The results of our ﬁrst stage regression (Equation (4))
are reported in Table 7. The model provides an excellent
ﬁt. Size and pre-SMBO performance (PreROA) are pos-
itively and signiﬁcantly associated with PE backing.
The industry dummy (BSERVICES) is negatively and
signiﬁcantly associated with PE backing.
Table 8 presents the results of the panel regressions
(Equation (5)) for determinants of SMBO perfor-
mance.17The R2s vary from 4.37% (estimates for
AROA) to 23.02% (estimates for ASALG). Wald χ2
statistics is statistically signiﬁcant in all models except
for AROS.
Our results demonstrate that SMBOs with greater
debt coverage (DEBCOV) have worse performance
in the ASALEMP models. Similarly, SMBOs with
higher gearing tend to exhibit worse proﬁtability
(AROA and AROS). PE backing is not signiﬁcantly
associated with changes in performance. This is
somewhat inconsistent with our univariate analysis.
The difference could be due to sample selection bias,
which was not controlled for in the univariate analysis.ley & Sons, Ltd.
Manage. Decis. Econ. 35: 88–102 (2014)
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Table 6. Differences in Post-SMBO Abnormal Performance by PE Backing
Benchmarks YI Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5
Proﬁtability ratios
AROA E(Pit) =Pit 1 <0.365 <0.104 <0.022 <0.115 <0.000
E(Pit) =Pit 1 +ΔPIit <0.123 <0.184 <0.037 <0.166 <0.115
AROS E(Pit) =Pit 1 >0.633 >0.596 >0.294 >0.468 <0.011
E(Pit) =Pit 1 +ΔPIit >0.756 >0.286 <0.497 >0.548 <0.386
Productivity ratios
ASALEMP E(Pit) =Pit 1 >0.029 >0.123 >0.309 <0.736 <0.000
E(Pit) =Pit 1 +ΔPIit >0.128 >0.078 >0.134 <0.242 <0.267
Growth ratios
AEMPG E(Pit) =Pit 1 >0.185 <0.973 <0.271 >0.970 >0.635
E(Pit) =Pit 1 +ΔPIit >0.271 >0.744 <0.416 <0.712 >0.061
ASALG E(Pit) =Pit 1 >0.294 <0.232 <0.329 <0.129 <0.533
E(Pit) =Pit 1 +ΔPIit >0.842 <0.543 <0.353 <0.092 >0.849
This table presents P-values for Mann–Whitney test for differences in median abnormal performance measures for PE-backed SMBOs and
non-PE-backed SMBOs, up to 5 years after SMBOs. Abnormal performance (APit ) estimated as APit=PitE(Pit), where Pit is the actua
performance ratio during post-event period and E(Pit) is expected performance of the SMBO during post-event period. ‘>’ indicates PE
backed SMBOs outperform non-PE-backed SMBOs; ‘<’ indicates PE-backed SMBOs underperform non-PE-backed SMBOs.
Table 7. Determinants of PE Backing
Independent variables Coefﬁcient
BSERVICES 0.314***
lnSIZE 1.402***
PreROA 0.869***
Intercept 0.844***
Log likelihood 470.078
Pseudo-R2 (%) 29.10
Wald χ2 231.60***
N 1295
This table shows the results of pooled probit model with robust vari
ance estimate for the probability of receiving PE backing by the sample
SMBOs. Dependent variable: PE (a dummy variable equaling to 1 i
the SMBO received PE backing and 0 otherwise). Independent vari
ables: BSERVICES (a dummy variable, which equals to 1 if the SMBO
target company is from business service industry, and 0 otherwise)
SIZE (the logarithm of SMBO deal’s value), and PreROA (the value
of return on assets in 1 year before SMBO). Thismodel converged afte
three iterations. P-values for the Wald test (Wald χ2) is for proﬁtability
>χ2. N is the number of pooled sample SMBOs used for the estima
tion, from the ﬁrst to ﬁfth post-SMBO years.
*** is signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
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f
-
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r
-The coefﬁcients for changes in management equity
stakes (MGTSHARE) are predominantly positive (but
not statistically signiﬁcant) except in models for AROS
and AEMPG. The coefﬁcients for CEO/CFO changes
(MGTCHAN) are positive (and statistically signiﬁ-
cant) in the ASALEMP models, suggesting that
changing CEO and/or CFO may improve the sales ef-
ﬁciency of buyouts. Notably, changes of CEO/CFO
tend to be negatively associated with proﬁtability
(measured by AROS) and employment growth (at
10% level of signiﬁcance).Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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-With regard to the control variables, it appears that
the ﬁnancial crisis is negatively associated with proﬁt-
ability (AROA) and growth (AEMPG and ASALG).
Our results demonstrate that companies with better
pre-SMBO proﬁtability (AROA) and growth (AEMPG
and ASALG) tend to perform worse in the post-SMBO
period.
The PE reputation (TOP10) is signiﬁcantly posi-
tively associated with AROA and AEMPG, indicating
that the reputation of PE ﬁrms has positive inﬂuence
on the proﬁtability and growth of target companies
(Table 9). Notably, SMBOs backed by more reputable
PE ﬁrms perform worse in terms of ASALEMP.
Overall, the main drivers of the improvements in
SMBO performance are PE reputation (proﬁtability
and employment) and replacement of management
(labor productivity).5. ROBUSTNESS AND FURTHER ANALYSIS
In this section, we conduct further analysis to examine
the robustness of our results. First, we present robust-
ness checks to choice of different benchmarks.
Second, we test for alternative measures of proﬁtability.
Third, we test the post-SMBO abnormal performance in
subsamples for different exit routes. Finally, we
compare performance of early and late exits from
sample SMBOs.
5.1. Alternative Benchmarks
To further investigate performance of sample SMBOs,
we compare their performance with the performance
able 8. Determinants of Post-SMBO Performance
AROA AROS ASALEMP AEMPG ASALG
GTSHARE 0.060 0.442* 0.025 0.029 0.077
EAR 0.018*** 0.102** 0.002 0.004 0.000
EBTCOV 0.000 0.013 0.001*** 0.001 0.001
GTCHAN 0.030 0.079 0.084** 0.022 0.048
E 0.060 0.294 0.097 0.037 0.098
SIZE 0.172 0.127 0.098 0.050 0.033
2nd DURA_all 0.457 0.643 0.114 0.054 0.067
risis 0.031*** 0.073 0.001 0.054* 0.089***
reROA 0.475** 0.579 0.023 0.498*** 0.620***
ambda 0.325 0.319 0.233 0.086 0.209
tercept 0.476 0.948 0.034 0.202 0.143
ald χ2 41.72*** 8.39 60.10*** 24.74*** 35.71***
2 (%) 4.37 4.66 4.59 18.58 23.02
501 432 390 397 373
his table reports the results of panel regression for determinants of post-SMBO abnormal performance, up to 5 years after SMBO. The de-
endent variables (APit) are estimated as APit =PitE(Pit), where E(Pit) =Pi,t 1. The results are based on winsorized data. All parameters
re estimated by a generalized least squares random-effects model with robust standard error and omitted collinear covariates. P-values for
e Wald test (Wald χ2) is for proﬁtability >χ2. N reports the number of ﬁrm-year observations used in the panel model.
**, **, and * are signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
able 9. PE Reputation and Post-SMBO Abnormal Performance
AROA AROS ASALEMP AEMPG ASALG
GTSHARE 0.049 0.015 0.069* 0.004 0.035
EAR 0.010 0.043 0.004 0.001 0.006
EBTCOV 0.000 0.006 0.001*** 0.001 0.001
GTCHAN 0.006 0.107 0.052 0.031 0.014
OP10 0.061** 0.268 0.060* 0.085* 0.065
SIZE 0.034 0.113 0.040 0.026 0.022
2nd DURA_all 0.065 0.820 0.075 0.185* 0.027
risis 0.013 0.106 0.009 0.023 0.049
re 0.685*** 0.880* 0.012 0.757*** 0.628***
ambda 0.030 0.765 0.003 0.058 0.226
tercept 0.122 1.471 0.074 0.305 0.123
ald χ2 33.83*** 6.01 23.43*** 40.11*** 32.83***
2 (%) 24.15 9.1 4.94 41.92 25.59
200 177 159 162 159
his table reports the results of panel regression for the effect of PE reputation on post-SMBO abnormal performance, up to 5 years after
MBO. The results are based on winsorized data. All parameters are estimated by a generalized least squares random-effects model with
bust standard error and omitted collinear covariates. P-values for the Wald test (Wald χ2) is for proﬁtability >χ2. N is number of obser-
ations used for the estimation, from the ﬁrst to ﬁfth post-SMBO years.
**, **, and * are signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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*of primary buyouts. The results, presented in panel A of
Table 10, demonstrate signiﬁcant underperformance of
SMBOs in proﬁtability, labor productivity and growth,
although there is a signiﬁcant outperformance of
SMBOs 1 year after buyout in terms of labor productiv-
ity. We also match our sample SMBOs with primary
buyouts on the basis of the following: industry classiﬁ-
cation, size (measured by logarithm of median total as-
set 3 years before buyouts), pre-event performance
(measured by median ROA 3years before buyouts),
and buyout year. We adopt a propensity score matching
method similar to that in Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983).
This approach overcomes the decrease in speciﬁcationCopyright © 2013 The Authors.
Managerial and Decision Economics published by John Wiand power of statistical results using traditional
matching approaches.18 Results of comparisons
between matched samples are reported in panel B. The
results conﬁrm worse performance of our sample
SMBOs compared with primary buyouts. Our ﬁndings,
therefore, support the earlier presented evidence that
performance deteriorates after SMBOs.5.2. Alternative Performance Measures
As depreciation and amortization may be used to man-
age earnings, earnings before interests and taxes (EBIT)
may provide a misleading picture of underlyingley & Sons, Ltd.
Manage. Decis. Econ. 35: 88–102 (2014)
DOI: 10.1002/mde
Table 10. Differences in Abnormal Performance between SMBOs and Primary Buyouts
YI Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5
Panel A: Comparison of non-matched samples
Proﬁtability ratios
AROA 0.049*** 0.053*** 0.059*** 0.134*** 0.041
AROS 0.002 0.008* 0.011*** 0.020*** 0.022**
Productivity
ASALEMP 0.020** 0.008 0.007 0.027* 0.057***
Growth ratios
AEMPG 0.017 0.004 0.039*** 0.020 0.050
ASALG 0.021 0.061** 0.067*** 0.067* 0.155***
Number of SMBOs 491
Number of primary MBOs 348
Panel B: Comparison of matched samples
Proﬁtability ratios
AROA 0.067*** 0.070*** 0.082*** 0.146*** 0.052
AROS 0.000 0.004 0.018*** 0.028*** 0.033*
Productivity
ASALEMP 0.020* 0.010 0.022 0.090*** 0.852***
Growth ratios
AEMPG 0.014 0.015 0.038** 0.008 0.110
ASALG 0.010 0.063 0.089*** 0.067 0.213***
Number of SMBOs 152
Number of primary MBOs 152
This table presents the difference in median abnormal performance measures for SMBOs and primary private-to-private buyouts, up to
5 years after SMBO. Abnormal ratios calculated using the following benchmark: E(Pit) =Pit 1. Differences are estimated as abnormal per
formance of SMBOs in year t minus abnormal performance of primary private-to-private buyouts in year t. Panel A shows the differences in
full samples. Panel B shows the differences in matched samples. The propensity score matching is based on industry, size, pre-buyout per
formance, and buyout year. All results are based on winsorized data. We employ the Mann–Whitney test to test the equality of abnorma
performance from the two samples.
***, **, and * indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
SMBO 99performance changes. We therefore check the robust-
ness of our results to use of proﬁtability ratios based
on income before depreciation and amortization
(EBITDAA, EBITDAS). The unreported results suggest
signiﬁcantly negative changes in AR (AEBITDAA) and
(AEBITDAS) from the ﬁrst to ﬁfth post-SMBO years.19
Overall, our results show a declining trend from the ﬁrst
to ﬁfth post-SMBO years. These results, therefore,
are consistent with our ﬁndings based on ratios that
use EBIT.205.3. Post-performance by Exit Routes
We also compare the performance of our sample
SMBOs by their exit status. The unreported results of
the comparison show that there are no signiﬁcant
differences in the performance of exited SMBOs
(regardless of the exit route) versus non-exited
SMBOs.21 We then compare the post-SMBO abnormal
performance of SMBOs exited via IPO, trade sales, and
receivership with the post-SMBOs abnormal per-
formance of SMBOs exited via TMBO. IPO exits
perform signiﬁcantly better than TMBO deals in terms
of growth (AEMPG and ASALG). Trade sales signiﬁ-
cantly outperform TMBO deals in labor productivityCopyright © 2013 The Authors.
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l(ASALEMP).22 The aforementioned results are in line
with the hypothesis that subsequent buyouts tend to be
used to buy more time for less successful companies.5.4. ‘Early’ versus ‘Late’ Exits
As discussed in Section 2, primary PE ﬁrms may exit
early because of the limited life of PE funds or
attempts to enhance their reputation by creating a track
record. When PE ﬁrms exit early, especially in the ﬁrst
two to three buyout years, the efforts of value creation
mechanisms may not be exhausted, thus leaving some
room for the performance improvement. Alternatively,
SMBOs could be adopted as a ‘last resort’ when a
successful exit was not achieved during the holding
period. Hence, it is important to examine the abnormal
performance in the post-SMBO phase for buyouts
with short (i.e. ‘early’ exits) and long primary buyout
holding periods (i.e., ‘late’ exits).
We divide primary PE-backed buyouts into the early
and late exit subsamples. The early subsample is deﬁned
as the primary holding period being equal to or shorter
than 2 years. The late subsample is deﬁned as the
primaries’ holding period being equal to or longer than
4 years. Our unreported results suggest lack of
D. ZHOU ET AL.100improvement in the performance in the early sample.23
For example, the results suggest a decline in proﬁtability
up to 5 years following SMBOs. In the late subsample,
we ﬁnd mixed evidence for proﬁtability. Whereas
AROA shows deterioration up to 4 years after SMBOs,
AROS shows improvement in the ﬁrst year after SMBO.
The evidence on labor productivity (ASALEMP) shows
statistically signiﬁcant improvements up to 3 years.
Combined evidence for early and late subsamples lends
support to our previous ﬁndings regarding the impor-
tance of PE backing. Reported lack of improvements
in the early subsample is also consistent with PE funds’
decision to exit quickly from ‘problematic’ buyouts and/
or buyouts without potential for value creation.6. CONCLUSION
On the basis of a unique dataset of 491 UK SMBO
deals, we analyze whether SMBOs experience an
improvement in performance. Our univariate analysis
reveals that there is a reduction in post-SMBO perfor-
mance, in terms of proﬁtability and growth. With
respect to labor productivity, unadjusted abnormal per-
formance shows signiﬁcant improvement after SMBOs.
However, after controlling for industry factors, the
results suggest that SMBO are underperforming their
industry peers. Our results also demonstrate a decreas-
ing trend in proﬁtability, labor productivity, and growth
from the ﬁrst to ﬁfth post-SMBO years. The results are
robust to the use of alternative performance measures
and benchmarks.
Although PE backing (alone) does not seem to drive
changes in performance, PE ﬁrms’ reputation is impor-
tant for improvements in proﬁtability. Important factors
affecting changes in labor productivity are gearing and
replacement of management. High percentages of debt
and management equity tend to be associated with poor
proﬁtability and labor productivity. With respect to exits
from SMBOs, IPOs and trade sales exhibit better post-
SMBO performance than TMBOs.
In sum, our analysis reveals intriguing ﬁndings
regarding the contrasting experience of primary and
secondary buyouts. Agency beneﬁts, associated with
debt and managerial equity stakes, seem to be exhausted
in primary buyouts. Instead, there tends to be entrench-
ment behavior, where management from the primary
buyout continues into the SMBO with a larger equity
stake and less control by PE ﬁrms. Our ﬁndings are
consistent with the efﬁciency improvements experi-
enced in primary buyouts beginning to be exhausted. It
appears that SMBOs are unable to adapt to changingCopyright © 2013 The Authors.
Managerial and Decision Economics published by John Wimarket conditions and to identify growth opportunities
in niche markets. Our ﬁndings also raise more general
questions as to why PE ﬁrms continue to invest in
SMBOs. PE ﬁrms having raised large funds need to ﬁnd
deals in which to invest. Yet it appears increasingly
difﬁcult to identify attractive primary deals due to
competition with other funds, a reduction in deal ﬂow
from corporations restructuring through the divestment
of divisions, and increasing difﬁculties in generating
returns from public to private buyouts (Wright et al.,
2009, 2010). SMBOs do not appear in general to offer
an attractive solution to this problem.ENDNOTES
1. The recorded drop in the SMBOs entries and exits
during the period of recent ﬁnancial crisis is consistent
with the worldwide evidence.
2. We end the list in 2007 to be able to track the perfor-
mance up to 2010.
3. In most target companies, management does not directly
invest in the equity. Instead, they invest in the parent com-
panies with 100% stake in the target companies. Hence,
we track the ownership structures of these companies to
identify the management stakes in the ownership.
4. We cross-check our SMBO list with the total of 3243
UK buyout deals listed in Thomson One Banker, during
2000 and 2007. Thomson One Banker, however, lists
only 167 UK SMBOs deals during our sample period.
5. FAME provides ﬁnancial information for 7 million
active and inactive UK and Irish companies.
6. We classify our sample buyouts into nine broad indus-
tries, in line with the technology and management
expertise in the venture capital industry (Gompers
et al., 2008): Internet and computers, communications
and electronics, business and industrial, consumer,
energy, biotech and healthcare, ﬁnancial service, business
service, and all others. The business services includes
companies associated with services, transport, hotel,
leisure, paper and packaging, wholesale, and distribution.
The business and industrial includes companies
associated with manufacturing, construction, engineering,
house building, vehicles and sheep building, steel, metals,
and non-metals. For other industry classes, we link a
three-digit primary SIC code of our sample companies
and Venture Economics Industry Classiﬁcation (VEIC
industry group), by using the concordance of VEIC code
and SIC code (Dushnitsky and Shaver, 2009). We are
indebted to Gary Dushnitsky for providing us with the
concordance that links VEIC and SIC schemes.
7. The unreported results of a Kolmogorov–Smirnov test
suggest different industry distribution of sample SMBOs
exited via TMBO and trade sale. The industry distribu-
tions of PE-backed and non-PE-backed sample SMBOs
are also statistically different. The results are available
upon request from authors.
8. This is consistent with earlier studies of buyouts
(Stromberg, 2008; Jelic, 2011).ley & Sons, Ltd.
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SMBO 1019. In PE-backed deals, management was changed in
29.41% cases. In the subsample of pure buyouts, the
management was changed in 23.81% of cases.
Unreported P value for the test of equal proportions
is 0.187.
10. We excluded the event year 0, as it includes both pre-
event and post-event operations, which are difﬁcult
to distinguish.
11. t is taking values for 1–5.
12. Winsorizing is performed by setting the observations
below the ﬁrst and above the 99th percentiles to the
values at the ﬁrst and 99th percentiles.
13. Unreported results of a Hosmer–Lemeshow goodness
of ﬁt test justify our performance for probit over
logit model.
14. Reputation score =½ * (ranking by number of deal
leads) +½* (ranking by total equity funding in £m).
The scores were calculated on the basis of data on deal
leaders and PE investments in more than 4000 UK buy-
outs. We included Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co, and
Apax in the most reputable PE ﬁrms, outside our
criteria, as they had established a reputation internation-
ally and are highly ranked in the most recent ratings of
PE ﬁrms provided by Private Equity International
(http://www.privateequityinternational.com/pei50). For
more on the ranking and advantages of this method for
ranking of PE ﬁrms, see Jelic (2011).
15. When it comes to syndicated PE backing, we adopt the
reputation of lead PE ﬁrms, as lead PE ﬁrms are
expected to be involved more in the investments
than others.
16. Maximum ROA of 5415.09 was recorded for Ryness
Ltd. The extreme value is due to a drastic decrease in
total assets in 2010. Minimum ROS was recorded for
SLR Group Ltd. The extreme value is due to very high
administration expenses in 2007.
17. In addition to the regression model based on Equation
((5)), we also tried the following regression models: (i)
model without control variables and Lambda; (ii) model
without control variables; (iii) model without Lambda;
and (iv) model without GEAR. The results of alternative
models are economically and statistically consistent
with the results reported in Table 8. The results are
available upon request from authors.
18. We use probit estimation and one-by-one nearest
matching without replacement. Unreported results ﬁnd
that one-by-one nearest matching with replacement
shows similar results.
19. Because of space constraints, we do not report the
results in full here, but they are available on request
from the authors.
20. It is, however, worth noting that measures based on
EBITDA yield lower proﬁtability.
21. Because of space constraints, we do not report the
results in full here, but they are available on request
from the authors.
22. Receiverships, which are buyouts in the UK’s
bankruptcy process, underperform TMBO deals on all
performance measures in the ﬁrst post-SMBO year.
23. Because of space constraints, we do not report the
results in full here, but they are available on request
from the authors.Copyright © 2013 The Authors.
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